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INTRODUCTION
Even in a discipline where ambiguity is cherished, law professors
are stumped when it comes to understanding the content of legal
education’s motto: “Teach them to think like a lawyer.” For decades,
scholars have groaned under the weight of trying to describe what
“thinking like a lawyer” means. 1 A recently popular educational
psychology construct may hold the answer: metacognition, or the
process of thinking about one’s thinking. Education theorists have
been much more successful in defining, explaining, and testing for
metacognition, than law professors have been in explaining
“thinking like a lawyer.”
This Article explains metacognitive skills in the context of law,
reviews the limited legal scholarship that references metacognitive
skills, and presents the first empirical study of the metacognitive skills
of newly admitted, highly qualified law students. The data
demonstrates that top law students—hardworking, overachieving
college graduates with high IQs—do not have well-developed
metacognitive skills. This Article then explores why metacognitive
skills are so helpful in performing the tasks required in the practice of
law and suggests that life-long, expert thinkers rely on developed
metacognitive skills. Unfortunately for many law students who do
not understand the purposes behind law professors’ pedagogical
techniques, Socratic Method sometimes leaves students believing
that thinking like a lawyer means avoiding straight answers and
promoting ambiguity. In light of this struggle, how can legal
1. Notwithstanding the persistent use of “thinking like a lawyer,” the various
definitions are both inconsistent and impossibly vague. To some, “thinking like a lawyer” has
only to do with analysis and a way of thinking. See, e.g., Peter Toll Hoffman, Teaching Theory
Versus Practice: Are We Training Lawyers or Plumbers?, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 625, 628
(footnotes omitted) (“The concept of thinking like a lawyer is ill-defined in the literature, and
subject to debate, but it usually means a particular method of thinking or analysis for
understanding law.”); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The
Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1251 n.85
(1991) (“The phrase ‘to think like a lawyer’ today means, more or less, to be capable of
independent thought, a highly prized attribute in today’s hierarchical, technocratic society.”).
To others, it is more than that, but also includes knowing and applying skills that are needed to
be a good lawyer. See, e.g., David R. Barnhizer, The Purposes and Methods of American Legal
Education, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 20 (2011) (“I have never thought that the real meaning of
‘thinking like a lawyer’ represents a passive state of mind, but one involving the ability to
actually function effectively as a lawyer in a dynamic and risky environment.”).
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educators convey what it means to “think like a lawyer”? Superb
metacognitive skills go a long way toward this goal.
Studies in education have demonstrated that highly developed
metacognitive skills help in converting a student into a life-long
learner—one whose education and learning do not stop when he
or she leaves school. Metacognitive skills improve oral
communication, written communication, and comprehension of
texts. In addition, metacognitive skills increase the speed and
accuracy of factual analysis and, because of the increased
confidence in performing these tasks, those with better
metacognitive skills suffer from less anxiety about performing
challenging intellectual tasks.
Legal education is in the throes of a painful revolution where
it has been charged to abandon the accepted methods of a
century—whether Socratic Method or merely the Langdellian
Method—and remake itself. 2 Moreover, this metamorphosis is to
take place in an economy where law school budgets are
increasingly stingy and alumni without jobs are not in a position
to become donors. The MacCrate Report, the Carnegie Report,
and a plethora of other scholarship have pushed legal education
from a largely cognitive endeavor to a balance with skills training. 3
We argue that the one fundamental skill being overlooked in this
transmutation is metacognition. If metacognition is highly
relevant to legal thinking and the demands of the profession, as
we assert in Part III, and if it can be taught, as we assert in Part
IV, then the critical question is whether law students are likely to
have already learned these lessons before graduate study or
whether they need to learn them in law school.

2. Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78 NEB. L. REV. 113,
114 (1999) (“In the place of the traditional approach is an eclectic mixture of newer
approaches, including toned-down Socratic questioning, student panels, group discussions,
and lectures.”).
3. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 21–46, 87–126 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]; ABA SECTION
OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter
MACCRATE REPORT]; See also Hoffman, supra note 1, at 643–45 (arguing that practical
training is just as important as “thinking like a lawyer,” but that this is not widely accepted in
law schools); Barnhizer, supra note 1, at 66–74 (including practical skills training as part of a
proposed curriculum plan for law schools).
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Our study, reported in Part II, illustrates that, when they are
promoting “skills training,” law schools should adopt teaching
methods that directly teach metacognitive skills. Of special
interest in the dialogue about legal education reform is the fact
that metacognitive skills are taught in the use of pure Socratic
Method, although more awareness of the concept of
metacognition would vastly assist in the process. Though Socrates
didn’t use the term, encouraging metacognitive thought was an
important component of his teaching approach centuries ago. 4
This Article is not the place to undertake a thorough defense of
the highly contested issue of Socratic Method or other approaches
to teaching metacognition; however, metacognition undoubtedly
will become a major component in any successful law school
reform and, with it, a reassessment of Socratic Method. 5
This Article begins in Part I with an overview of the concept
of metacognition and its role in enhancing thinking. We
distinguish related but separate concepts and review the most
4. See, e.g., Barry Ritholtz, How’s Your MetaCognition?, RITHOLTZ.COM (Aug. 16,
2013, 8:45 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/08/hows-your-metacognition
(“Socrates perhaps most famously declared ‘I only know that I know nothing;’ He was perhaps
the first human to wax eloquent on metacognition. It may be counter-intuitive, but
understanding one’s own ignorance is the first step to attaining knowledge.”); David Denton,
Reflection and Learning: Characteristics, Obstacles, and Implications, 43 EDUCATION
PHILOSOPHY & THEORY 838, 842 (citation omitted) (“Socrates integrated metacognitive
thinking as well. For instance, Socrates recommends examining one’s thoughts and identifying
gaps in one’s arguments.”). Although a number of components of Socratic Method can be tied
to metacognitive skills, the most apparent is the metacognitive skill of recognizing what the
thinker already knows and what will need to be learned new. An expert thinker does not
reinvent the wheel but transfers knowledge of information and skill previously acquired to the
task at hand and then identifies what additional knowledge is required. The correlation
between this step and Socrates’ humility can be described as follows:
If what we believe so confidently could well be wrong, then the appropriate attitude
ought to be humility about what we think we know. Humility is just what the
philosopher Socrates wanted from his students in ancient Greece. . . . The Socratic
Method involves teaching by asking a series of questions. By posing questions to
young philosophers, Socrates was able to evoke what they knew about a topic . . . .
Inevitably, the dialogues resulted in much greater clarity about what was known and
what was unknown.
MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, LEARNING AND COGNITION: THE DESIGN OF THE MIND 133
(2010) (citing DONALD PALMER, LOOKING AT PHILOSOPHY: THE UNBEARABLE HEAVINESS
OF PHILOSOPHY MADE LIGHTER (3rd ed. 2001).
5. For a brief discussion of the relationship of Socratic Method and metacognition, and
the possibility that the MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, recognized skills that are
metacognitive but did not so label them, see the text accompanying notes 96–97 infra.
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recent education literature on the subject. In Part II, this Article
reports the empirical results of our study, which illustrate that the
metacognitive skills of many, and probably most, entering law
students are weak. In Part III, this Article describes how
metacognitive skills are critical to the kinds of activities law
students and lawyers perform. It then reviews in Part IV extant
legal literature on metacognition and the need for more
consistent and rigorous work in this area, as well as current efforts
to teach metacognition in some schools. The Article then
concludes in Part V with suggestions for further research.
I. METACOGNITION AND THE STUDY OF THINKING
Metacognition is a construct that was first articulated by John
Flavell, 6 who later defined it as “cognition about cognitive
phenomena[.]” 7 Metacognition, so named and defined, has only
recently become a focus of cognitive-developmental inquiry. 8 Often
described informally as “thinking about thinking,” 9 metacognition is
the concept that individuals can monitor and regulate their own
cognitive processes and thereby improve the quality and effectiveness
of their thinking. Teaching metacognitive skills to thinkers is similar

6. John H. Flavell, Metacognitive Aspects of Problem Solving, in THE NATURE OF
INTELLIGENCE 231, 232 (Lauren B. Resnick ed., 1976). Flavell provided illustrative examples
of the thinking about thinking involved in metacognition:
[I]f I notice that I am having more trouble learning A than B; if it strikes me that I
should double-check C before accepting it as a fact; if it occurs to me that I had
better scrutinize each and every alternative in any multiple-choice type task situation
before deciding which is the best one; if I become aware that I am not sure what the
experimenter really wants me to do; if I sense that I had better make a note of D
because I may forget it; if I think to ask someone about E to see if I have it right.
Id.
7. John H. Flavell, Metacognition and Cognitive Monitoring: A New Area of CognitiveDevelopmental Inquiry, 34 AM. PSYCHOL. 906, 906 (Oct. 1979).
8. While searching Google Scholar citations for Flavell’s 1979 article, we found 269
citations for the ten-year period from 1979 to 1989 and 3060 citations for the ten-year period
from 2002 to 2012.
9. See, e.g., EMILY R. LAI, METACOGNITION: A LITERATURE REVIEW 4 (2011),
available
at
http://www.pearsonassessments.com/lai/images/tmrs/Metacognition
_Literature_Review_Final.pdf; Savia A. Coutinho, The Relationship Between Goals,
Metacognition, and Academic Success, 7 EDUCATE 39, 40 (2007);.Sevgi Turan, Özcan Demirel
& Iskender Sayek, Metacognitive Awareness and Self-Regulated Learning Skills of Medical
Students in Different Medical Curricula, 31 MED. TCHR. 477, 477 (2009) (defining
metacognition also as “cognition about cognition”).
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to what coaches and athletic psychologists try to teach athletes. They
bring to the forefront the awareness of how to maximize, and
consistently tap into, all the talent and genius possessed by the
player, both inherently and by the process of practice. It is the
awareness and then strategic adjustment that pushes someone with
flashes of brilliance into a consistently brilliant thinker who can learn,
absorb, and apply new material with increasing ease.
Metacognition requires having both awareness of the process and
the ability to control learning and thinking. 10 The two components
are identified as knowledge 11 and regulation. 12 It appears that
metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation develop
independently of each other. 13 By the time students reach adulthood,
most have fairly well-developed metacognitive knowledge. 14 In
contrast, metacognitive regulation, which involves “the monitoring
of one’s cognition and includes planning activities, awareness of
comprehension and task performance, and evaluation of the efficacy
of monitoring processes and strategies,” is frequently
underdeveloped. 15
Understanding metacognition requires distinguishing it from
other concepts. Metacognition is different from mindfulness, though

10. Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Lawyers and Learning: A Metacognitive Approach to Legal
Education, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 33, 35 (2006) [hereinafter Niedwiecki, Lawyers].
11. For a definition of metacognitive knowledge, see LAI, supra note 9, at 2
(“[K]nowledge about oneself as a learner and the factors that might impact performance,
knowledge about strategies, and knowledge about when and why to use strategies.”).
12. Id.
13. Gregory Schraw, The Effect of Knowledge on Local and Global Monitoring, 19
CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 143, 143 (1994).
14. In one study, researchers found a significant difference between graduates and
undergraduates in metacognitive regulation, but not metacognitive knowledge. Andria Young &
Jane D. Fry, Metacognitive Awareness and Academic Achievement in College Students, 8 J. SCHOL.
TEACHING & LEARNING 1, 7–8 (2008). A more recent study found no significant difference
between undergraduate and graduate students in business in either knowledge or regulation, but
graduate students in teacher education demonstrated a measureable difference in metacognitive
regulation when compared to undergraduates. Louise R. Moulding, Penée W. Stewart & Susan S.
Cooper, Metacognitive Development in Undergraduate and Graduate Students in Teacher
Education and Business Administration, 14 J. INT’L SOC. TCHR. EDUC. 49 (2010).
15. LAI, supra note 9, at 2. Metacognitive regulation is comprised of three separate
skills: planning, monitoring, and evaluation. Planning is “the selection of appropriate
strategies and the allocation of resources that affect performance”; monitoring is “awareness
of comprehension and task performance”; and evaluation “refers to appraising the products
and efficiency of one’s learning.” Gregory Schraw, Promoting General Metacognitive
Awareness, 26 INSTRU. SCI. 113, 115 (1998).
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they are related concepts. 16 Mindfulness “generally refers to a
deliberate, present-moment, non-judgmental awareness of whatever
passes through the five conventional senses and the mind: emotions,
thoughts, and body sensations.” 17 Mindfulness is awareness of inthe-moment thought, while metacognition is awareness and
regulation of the process of thinking, reasoning, and learning. The
concepts overlap as both mindfulness and metacognition include
awareness and, to some extent, self-regulation. 18 Mindfulness is often
associated with awareness of the substantive content of a person’s
thinking and control of emotions while metacognition is thinking of
the cognitive strategies and processes used while thinking.
For example, mindfulness may be demonstrated when a student
is writing a journal entry or a reflection paper for a law class on what
new information has been learned. 19 Metacognitive work could also
employ a journal, but the point would be for the student to reflect
on and record how the student learned, rather than what the student
learned. 20 Metacognition is thinking about the cognitive process or
strategies used while thinking about, or trying to learn, the content
and then mentally monitoring if the strategy is working well and
how it can be subsequently improved. 21

16. See, e.g., Robin C. Mörck, Are Metacognition and Mindfulness Related Concepts? 8–9
(2009), (unpublished dissertation, Örebro University), available at http://nai.divaportal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:275993 (discussing the relatedness of the two concepts
and citing studies that have regarded mindfulness as an aspect of metacognition); Scott R.
Bishop et al., Mindfulness: A Proposed Operational Definition, 11 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI. &
PRAC. 230, 233 (2004) (“[M]indfulness can be defined, in part, as the self-regulation of
attention . . . . In this context, mindfulness can be considered a metacognitive skill.”); Fadal
Zeidan et al., Mindfulness Meditation Improves Cognition: Evidence of Brief Mental Training,
19 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 597, 598 (2010) (citation omitted) (“Mindfulness
training cultivates moment-to-moment awareness of the self and environment. To this extent,
mindfulness training heightens meta-cognitive processing.”).
17. Leonard L. Riskin, Awareness and the Legal Profession: An Introduction to the
Mindful Lawyer Symposium, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 634, 635 (2012). See also Leonard L. Riskin,
The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law
Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 23, 48 (2002) (“In
mindfulness meditation, a person seeks . . . to notice . . . whatever passes through her
awareness. . . .”) [hereinafter Riskin, Contemplative].
18. See, e.g., Riskin, Contemplative, supra note 17 (“[M]indfulness meditation can help
develop . . . self-awareness [and] self-regulation.”).
19. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
20. Niedwiecki, Lawyers, supra note 10 (defining metacognition as the “awareness and
control over one’s learning and thinking”).
21. Id.
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Intelligence and metacognition are also related, but different,
constructs. Intelligence is “the ability to learn or understand or to
deal with new or trying situations” and “the skilled use of reason
[or] the ability to apply knowledge to manipulate one’s environment
or to think abstractly as measured by objective criteria.” 22 In
contrast, metacognition is “the ability to reflect upon, understand
and control one’s learning” as a process. 23 In other words,
intelligence is the ability to learn or apply knowledge in one’s life
while metacognition is the ability to monitor and evaluate how well
one is doing at learning and applying that knowledge and then
making necessary adjustments. Cesare Cornoldi maintains
metacognition affects the use of basic intelligence in many ways. 24
For instance, metacognition is important for the execution of higherlevel thinking skills, such as analysis and synthesis, but seems to have
little impact on low-level thinking tasks, such as recalling details of a
case. 25 Metacognition also increases the ability to use a cognitive skill
learned in one situation in another very different setting. 26
Metacognition enhances intelligence and increases the ability to
learn and to perform thinking tasks—it is the skill that maximizes the
utility of intelligence. 27 Thus, students with lesser intellectual ability
who have greater metacognitive skills often demonstrate academic
performance similar to students with higher intellectual ability. 28 For

22. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
DICTIONARY,
available
at
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/intelligence (last visited Sept. 4, 2013).
23. Gregory Schraw & Rayne Sperling Dennison, Assessing Metacognitive Awareness, 19
CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 460, 460 (1994).
24. Cesare Cornoldi, Metacognition, Intelligence, and Academic Performance, in
HARRIET S. WATERS & WOLFGANG SCHNEIDER, METACOGNITION, STRATEGY USE AND
INSTRUCTION 257, 274 (2010) (“[M]etacognition appears particularly critical because it
affects the most central aspects of basic intelligence and may directly contribute to a better
capacity to control working memory operations. Another important reason for paying
particular attention to the educational implications of metacognition is that usual life events
and traditional cultural and educational efforts do not necessarily guarantee the development
of metacognition.”).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Robin A. Boyle, Employing Active-Learning Techniques and Metacognition in Law
School: Shifting Energy from Professor to Student, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 27 (2003)
(“[W]hile teaching to diverse learning styles is helpful for students, adding metacognitive
strategies maximizes student performance.”).
28. Guy Trainin & H. Lee Swanson, Cognition, Metacognition, and Achievement of
College Students with Learning Disabilities, 28 LEARNING DISABILITY Q. 261, 262 (2005); see
also H. Lee Swanson, Influence of Metacognitive Knowledge and Aptitude on Problem Solving,
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instance, one study found that “intellectual ability uniquely
accounted for 10% of variance in learning performance,
metacognitive skillfulness uniquely accounted for 17% of variance in
learning performance, while both predictors shared another 22% of
variance in learning.” 29 Thus, metacognitive abilities combined with
intelligence are a greater predictor of learning performance than
intelligence alone. 30
Metacognition supports and enhances learning, but is a separate
skill that is not automatically developed as a result of traditional
educational experiences or life events. 31 When students are taught to
be metacognitive, they demonstrate a higher level of intellectual
awareness maturity 32 and thus outperform peers who are not taught
metacognition even when these peers have similar intelligence. 33 No
matter the starting point, high levels of metacognition enable
students of all intelligence levels to be more strategic in their
learning. Researcher John Hattie recently completed a
comprehensive analysis of education to “develop an explanatory
story about the key influences in student learning.” 34 He found that
metacognitive strategies had an effect size of .69, which is equivalent
to moving from the fiftieth percentile to the seventy-fifth
percentile. 35 In other words, if a student were performing at an

82 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 306, 306 (1990).
29. Marcel V.J. Veenman & Marleen A. Spaans, Relation Between Intellectual and
Metacognitive Skills: Age and Task Differences, 15 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
159, 161 (2005).
30. See id.
31. Cornoldi, supra note 24.
32. Nancy Joseph, Metacognition Needed: Teaching Middle and High School Students to
Develop Strategic Learning Skills, 54 PREVENTING SCH. FAILURE: ALTERNATIVE EDUC. FOR
CHILD. & YOUTH 99, 100 (2009).
33. Such findings are not limited to one content area, but occur across multiple school
subjects. Annette F. Gourgey, Metacognition in Basic Skills Instruction, 26 INSTRU. SCI. 81, 86
(1998); Bracha Kramarski, Zemira R. Mevarech & Marsel Arami, The Effects of Metacognitive
Instruction on Solving Mathematical Authentic Tasks, 49 EDUC. STUD. MATHEMATICS 225,
228–29 (2002); Zemira R. Mevarech & Chagit Amrany, Immediate and Delayed Effects of
Meta-Cognitive Instruction on Regulation of Cognition and Mathematics Achievement, 3
METACOGNITION & LEARNING 147, 147 (2008); Zemira R. Mevarech & Bracha Kramarski,
Improve: A Multidimensional Method for Teaching Mathematics in Heterogeneous Classrooms, 34
AM. EDUC. RES. J. 365, 386 (1997).
34. JOHN HATTIE, VISIBLE LEARNING: A SYNTHESIS OF OVER 800 META-ANALYSES
RELATING TO ACHIEVEMENT 6 (2009).
35. Effect size is a measure of performance in standard deviation units, making .69 a
substantial difference in performance. Id. at 189.
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average level (fiftieth percentile), by using metacognitive strategies,
he would move to the top quarter of the class.
Another way metacognition may improve performance and
maximize intelligence is in helping to mitigate the effects of
anxiety. 36 Students with high levels of metacognitive ability also
display higher levels of confidence in their ability to answer problems
correctly. 37 Higher confidence can inhibit negative anxiety-related
interruptions to mental processes. 38
Metacognition has become an extremely important concept in
education scholarship. Most educational psychology texts now
devote a section to metacognition and its relationship to learning,
and a second general handbook on metacognition in education has
recently been published. 39 Metacognition and Learning, an
international journal dedicated to the study of metacognition,
published its first issue in 2006. 40 In 2008, Educational Psychology
Review devoted a special issue to metacognition, self-regulation, and
self-regulated learning, summarizing what is currently known about
the topic and highlighting areas that still need investigation. 41 The
breadth and depth of this scholarship in educational psychology and
related disciplines demonstrates the intense interest in
metacognition, the progress made in understanding it, and the
importance of teaching it.
II. A STUDY OF LAW STUDENTS’ METACOGNITIVE SKILLS
We began this project assuming that law students, with their high
academic credentials, would be relatively advanced in their
metacognitive abilities. The skills needed to succeed in law school
and as a lawyer—problem-solving, oral and reading comprehension,
writing, etc.—are significantly enhanced by metacognition. More

36. Math students who exhibit high math anxiety but also demonstrate high levels of
metacognition have similar test performances as students who have low levels of math anxiety.
Angela M. Legg & Lawrence Locker Jr., Math Performance and Its Relationship to Math
Anxiety and Metacognition, 11 N. AM. J. OF PSYCHOL. 471, 471 (2009).
37. Id. at 479.
38. Id. at 481.
39. HANDBOOK OF METACOGNITION IN EDUCATION (Douglas J. Hacker, John
Dunlosky & Arthur C. Graesser eds., 2009) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
40. Metacognition
and
Learning,
SPRINGERLINK,
http://link.springer.com/journal/11409 (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).
41. 20(4) ED. PSYCHOL. REV. (2008).
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importantly, high metacognitive awareness and regulation links to
better academic performance. 42 The students in our study
demonstrated academic success, illustrated by the grades and test
scores necessary to be admitted to the law school, and would seem
likely to have excellent metacognitive skills. They do not.
Fortunately, individual students whose metacognitive skills are
lower “may benefit from metacognitive training to improve their
metacognition and academic performance.” 43 Our work sets a
framework for additional empirical research on law student
metacognitive skills, supports the need for more, solid scholarship in
law and metacognition, and encourages the further development of
programs to teach metacognitive skills in law schools.
A. Method
The purpose of this study was to investigate the metacognition
of first-year law students. Can law professors assume that most
students who obtain admission in law programs are already equipped
with sufficient metacognitive skills? If not, teaching metacognitive
skills should then be a priority.
1. Participants
Participants were 150 law students, representing approximately
one-half of the first-year class beginning their first semester in fall
2010 and one-half of the class beginning in fall 2013 at the J.
Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University (“BYU”). 44
The two cohorts are appropriately combined given the statistical
evidence of similarity and are thus analyzed as a single group. 45 The
42. ROBERT J. STERNBERG, Metacognition, Abilities, and Developing Expertise: What
Makes an Expert Student?, in METACOGNITION IN LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION: THEORY,
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 247, 247 (Hope J. Hartman ed., 2001) (“The various researchers
use a variety of theoretical frameworks, methodologies, subject-matter areas, and arguments to
make a fully persuasive case for the importance of metacognition to school success. One could
critique any one study or set of results, but the strength . . . is in the converging operations, all
of which make the identical case.”).
43. Savia A. Coutinho, The Relationship Between Goals, Metacognition, and Academic
Success, 7 EDUCATE, no. 1, 2007 at 40; see also Niedwiecki, Lawyers, supra note 10, at 42
(“The theory behind metacognition is that those learners who apply appropriate metacognitive
strategies are better self-regulated and effective learners.”).
44. A request for participation was sent to the entire entering class, and seventy students
from each class self-selected to participate.
45. The two cohorts were compared on the dependent variables in this study to ensure
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BYU law students entering in 2010 had a median entrance GPA of
3.75 and a median Law School Admission Test (LSAT) score of 164
out of 180, which puts the 2010 group in the ninetieth percentile of
all people who took the LSAT in the three years prior. 46 At the top
quarter of admitted students in 2010, or the seventy-fifth percentile,
the LSAT score was 167 and the GPA was 3.86. The BYU law
students entering in 2013 had a slightly higher median GPA of 3.77,
and a slightly lower median LSAT score of 161 out of 180, which
puts the 2013 group in the seventy-fifth percentile of all people who
took the LSAT in the three years prior. However, the seventy-fifth
percentile of admitted BYU students in 2013 had a 3.88 GPA, which
was higher than those in 2010, and a median LSAT score of 164 of
180. Thus, the students in the study fit easily in the top quarter of
U.S. law students.
The participants in our study also generally represent law
students recently admitted to schools ranked in the top thirty to the
top fifty in the nation. Although efforts to rank law schools are
extremely problematic given how the various factors are weighed,
such rankings may be useful in putting the students in this study in
context. U.S. News and World Report (US News) ranked BYU as the
forty-second best U.S. law school overall in 2010, 47 and thirty-sixth
in 2014. 48 Brian Leiter’s Law School Rankings, which focuses on
students’ LSAT scores, GPAs, and class size, ranked BYU thirty-third
in the nation in 2010, 49 but did not conduct such rankings for more
recent years. Business Insider ranked BYU thirty-fourth in 2012. 50

that they were from the same population and could be combined into a single group without
compromising the interpretation of the results. There was no significant difference in the mean
scores for the dependent variables, providing evidence that the two cohorts are indeed from
the same population and can be combined in further analysis. See infra note 65.
46. LSAT Score Conversion, ALPHASCORE, http://www.alphascore.com/resources/lsatscore-conversion (last updated Mar. 4, 2011).
47. Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 2010), at 74, 74 (ranked as 42).
48. Schools of Law Rankings, U.S. News & World Rep. 2015 ed., at 84 (ranking BYU
at thirty sixth), available at http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/bestgraduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings/page+2 (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
49. Ranking of Top 40 Law Schools by Student (Numerical) Quality 2010, BRIAN
LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL RANKINGS (June 1, 2010), http://www.leiterrankings.com/
students/2010_top40lawschools.shtml. In 2010, BYU Law School was ranked thirty-first in
median LSAT score of matriculated students and fourteenth in median entrance GPA. LAW
SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE
TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS: 2012 EDITION 56–61 (2011).
50. Jennifer Polland, The 50 Best Law Schools in America, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 4,
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Moreover, BYU ranks high in placing students in the limited and
coveted positions as Supreme Court clerks. Over the 2003–2013
terms, BYU students ranked thirteenth under “‘Per Capita’ Clerkship
Placement” and seventeenth in “Total Clerkship Placement.” 51 The
Princeton Review Most Competitive Students list moved BYU students
up from third in 2012 to second in 2013 and 2014. 52
This is the first empirical study of metacognition and law
students ever published. Although more research using larger sample
sizes and longitudinal studies would be useful, we can begin to
understand the implications for legal education with these results.
Because we understood that, independently, the data derived from
the study would not hold much meaning for readers outside of
education disciplines, we looked for other studies dealing with highly
qualified postgraduate students for a basis of comparison. Most of
the extant literature focuses on secondary and college students.
Although medical schools have recently become interested in
metacognition and some studies using the same survey instrument
are underway, 53 few published studies exist at this level.
We compared the law student data with results using the same
instrument on seventy-three volunteer master’s degree students in
business administration and fifty-three volunteer master’s degree
students in education at Weber State University, a nearby regional
university. We assumed both the comparison groups would score
lower on metacognition than the law students because of the high
academic scores of the law students. The Weber students have lower
academic qualifications based on objective measures. 54

2012, 10:17 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-50-best-law-schools-in-america2012-9?op=1.
51. Supreme Court Clerkship Placement, 2003 Through 2013 Terms, BRIAN LEITER’S
LAW SCHOOL RANKINGS (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.leiterrankings.com/new/2013
_SCClerkshipPlacement.shtml.
52. The Princeton Review: Most Competitive Students, http://www.princetonreview.com
/SchoolList.aspx?id=729 (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
53. A surgical educator, Jack Contessa, at Yale New Haven Hospital has been
conducting research on surgical residents using the MAI, the same instrument we used in our
study. The data has been collected but not yet analyzed. Contessa contacted one of the authors
of this study by email to make sure that he used the same descriptors for the MAI Likert scale
in his study as we did in ours. Emails from Jack Contessa, Medical Educator at Yale New
Haven Hospital, to Penée Stewart, Professor of Teacher Education, Weber State University,
(Nov. 12, 2012, 1:25 PM MST & Sept. 3, 2013, 4:42 AM MST) (on file with authors).
54. The Master of Business Administration students had an average entrance GPA of 3.4
and an average Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) score of 560 out of 800,
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The student populations were similar in race and cultural traits,
but two differences may be interesting. The mean age of students in
the business administration and education programs was greater than
the mean age of the law students, and the spread in age was wider.
The law students were, on average, younger and closer in age. We
include age and gender information in Table 1 in the Appendix,
although previous studies have shown that metacognition is not
related to gender. 55 The preponderance of males in the business
administration program and females in teacher education made it
unreasonable to conduct analysis by gender without the influence of
program.
2. Instrumentation
The survey instrument used in this study was the Metacognitive
Awareness Inventory (MAI). The MAI is a self-report questionnaire
developed by Gregory Schraw and R.S. Dennison in 1994 that is
commonly used in metacognition studies of adults. 56 Earlier studies
have shown that the MAI is reliable. 57 The MAI consists of fifty-two

which is the fifty-second percentile. Email from Peggy J. Saunders, Director, Master of
Education Program, Associate Professor, Weber State University, to Penée Stewart, Professor
of Teacher Education, Weber State University, (Nov. 10, 2014, 5:27 PM MST) (on file with
authors). The Weber Masters of Education students had an average entrance GPA of 3.82.
Students applying to the program with a GPA between 3.0 and 3.24 must submit Miller’s
Analogies Test (MAT) scores with a minimum of 400 or Graduate Record Examination (GRE)
scores with minimum 480 each on the Verbal and Quantitative Reasoning, and 5.0 on the
Analytical Writing portion. Because applicants who have higher than a 3.25 GPA are not
required to submit MAT or GRE scores for the masters of education program, we do not have
average GRE scores for this program. According to US News, Weber is sixty-eighth among the
NEWS,
regional
universities
in
the
West.
Weber
State
University,
U.S.
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/weber-state-university3680/rankings (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
55. See, e.g., Elaine M. Justice & Teresa M. Dornan, Metacognitive Differences Between
Traditional-Age and Nontraditional-Age College Students, 51 ADULT EDUC. Q. 236, 246
(2001).
56. Schraw & Dennison, supra note 23, at 460–75. While most metacognitive
instruments have been designed for use with children and adolescents, the MAI was designed
specifically for use with adults. This self-report instrument continues to be used in studies of
adult metacognition. See, e.g., Mörck, supra note 16, at 11; Rayne A. Sperling et al.,
Metacognition and Self-Regulated Learning Constructs, 10 EDUC. RES. & EVALUATION 117,
123–35 (2004); Turan et al., supra note 9, at 477–78; Young & Fry, supra note 14, at 1–10.
57. Schraw and Dennison reported that Cronbach’s α coefficient for the entire
instrument was 0.95 in their first study, Schraw & Dennison, supra note 23, at 464, and 0.93
in their second study. Schraw & Dennison, supra note 23, at 468. Cronbach’s α for the two
subscales were 0.91 in their first, and 0.88 in their second, study. Id. Sperling, et al. also found
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statements to which participants respond by marking on a five-point
Likert scale, with zero indicating “never” and five indicating
“always.” 58 The MAI statements represent the two components of
metacognition: knowledge and regulation. 59 Within the knowledge
component are statements of declarative knowledge (knowledge
about self and strategies), procedural knowledge (knowledge about
strategy use), and conditional knowledge (knowledge about when
and why to use strategies). 60 The regulation component covers
planning (goal setting), information management (organizing),
monitoring (assessment of learning and strategy), debugging
(strategies to correct errors), and evaluation (analysis of performance
and strategy effectiveness). 61 The survey was administered using
standard procedures. 62
that the instrument was reliable, and was related with both the Learning Strategies Survey
(LSS) and the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ). Sperling et al., supra
note 56. Together these findings indicate that the MAI is reliable and valid.
58. Instead of using the four-point scale that Schraw and Dennison originally employed,
we used a five-point Likert scale with alternatives: (0) never, (1) seldom, (2) sometimes, (3)
often, and (4) always. Other than that modification, the instrument was presented in the same
way as in Schraw and Dennison’s original study. In a personal email, Schraw reported that he
now recommends using the five-point scale. Email from Gregory Schraw, Dir., UNLV Ctr. for
Research, Evaluation, & Assessment, to Penée Stewart, Professor of Teacher Education, Weber
State University, (Jan. 14, 2013, 12:38 PM MST) (on file with author).
59. Knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition are further separated into
theoretical subscales. The subscales for knowledge about cognition are declarative knowledge,
procedural knowledge, and conditional knowledge. The subscales for regulation of cognition
consist of planning, information management, monitoring, debugging, and evaluation.
However, Schraw and Dennison obtained support only for a two-component model of
metacognition. Schraw & Dennison, supra note 23, at 470. Thus, the MAI should be regarded
as a means to measure knowledge about cognition and regulation of cognition, not as a
number of separate subcomponents of metacognition.
60. Sample items on knowledge of cognition are, “I am a good judge of how well I
understand something,” and “I understand my intellectual strengths and weaknesses.” Schraw
& Dennison, supra note 23, at 473 Q5, Q32.
61. Sample items on regulation of cognition are, “I think about what I really need to
learn before I begin a task,” and “I ask myself if I have considered all options when solving a
problem.” Schraw & Denison supra note 23, at 473 Q6, Q 11.
62. Researchers administered the survey instrument during class sessions in the three
graduate programs. The survey was administered in paper form for business and education
students and online for law students, but this distinction has no substantive content.
Cooperation from the course instructors facilitated the administration and encouraged
participation. All students were informed that the survey was voluntary, and some chose not to
participate.
For each respondent, three scores were generated and used in data analysis: scores for
metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive regulation, and total MAI. Data from the survey
instrument were analyzed using group membership as the independent variable and the three
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B. Results
After a brief explanation of how the data were analyzed, we will
explain our results and conclusions. We report on three scales: MAI
knowledge, MAI regulation, and combined. Table 2 in the Appendix
presents the descriptive statistics for each group.
In general, education students scored higher on metacognitive
knowledge than the business and law students, but not
significantly. 63 Education students likewise scored higher in
metacognitive regulation, and law students scored the lowest, 64 with
the differences being statistically significant as shown on Table 3 in
the Appendix. 65 To isolate the differences between the groups, a
Tamhane (T2) post hoc test was performed (see Table 4 in the
Appendix). This revealed that the significant difference in regulation
and total scores was between the graduate students in education and
students in the other two programs. Education graduate students’
mean scores were significantly higher than graduate business and law
student mean scores, even accounting for differences in age.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
The results of this study may seem surprising initially. Although
all of the participants in the study were successful undergraduate
students, we wondered whether the BYU law students would
demonstrate greater metacognitive skills given their academic
credentials, and the relevance of metacognitive skills to the nature of
their study and the profession of law. All three groups had similar
metacognitive knowledge, but the BYU law students and Weber
business students had significantly lower metacognitive regulation

MAI scores (knowledge, regulation, and total score) as dependent variables in a one-way
analysis of co-variance (ANCOVA). Alpha was set at 0.05 for all statistical tests.
63. Research suggests that by the time learners become adults, metacognitive
knowledge is fairly well developed, while metacognitive regulation may be underdeveloped. It
appears that metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation develop independently of
each other. See Schraw, supra note 13, at 152.
64. The two cohort groups of law students were compared to ensure that they were of
the same population and could be combined for analysis. There was no significant difference
for metacognitive knowledge [F(1, 148)=.045, p=0.833], metacognitive regulation [F(1,
148)=.923, p=0.338], or metacognitive total [F(1, 148)=.402, p=0.527].
65. An ANCOVA was performed with group membership as the independent variable,
scores as the dependent variable, and age as the covariate. Results indicate that there was no
significant difference in scores for metacognitive knowledge.
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scores than the Weber education graduate students.
When statistically significant mean score differences are found,
three possible explanations arise. First, the differences may be a result
of sampling error (chance). This is an unlikely explanation in this
study given the low probability values of the Analysis of Co-variance
(ANCOVA).
Second, there may be some threats to the internal validity of the
study based on study design and procedures. There were differences
in the characteristics of each program’s sample that may influence the
results. For example, the law students were just beginning their first
year of law school, while the graduate business and education
students were at varying stages of program completion. In addition,
the law students were younger and more homogeneous in age than
the other participants. This may play a part in explaining differences
in metacognitive regulation. The results of the ANCOVA showed
significant differences between education students and the other
participants when age was a covariate. Experience rather than age is
the more likely explanation for the differences.
The third and most likely explanation is that the data accurately
reflect the true differences in performance between graduate
education students and law and business students. In the next
subpart we explore what may account for the lower performance of
law students.
D. Possible Explanations for Low Law Student Performance
At first blush, it seems strange that law students with high
entrance scores do not demonstrate metacognitive skills that are as
well developed as graduate education students at a regional
university. In this subpart we explore the likely explanations and
what they mean for the development of legal education. The first
clue may lie in the fact that the education students have honed the
ability to teach new and struggling thinkers to think. Teachers
develop metacognitive skills in the process of figuring out how to
transfer the processes in their own heads to others. Secondly, the
natural intelligence and talent of law students may have been enough
to perform well in school so far without the boost generated by
metacognitive skills. This assumption is supported by research on the
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metacognitive skills of medical students, a population who also have
done very well through undergraduate work. 66
The first explanation may lie in the nature of education as a
discipline and the fact that the master’s degree education students in
the comparative study have not only studied learning theory as
undergraduates but also have had experience as teachers. Research
suggests a relationship between metacognition and teaching
experience. 67 Teachers are trained to focus on the underlying core of
learning and then design instruction to help their students do more
capable thinking about the information presented. In this process,
teachers naturally become aware of their own thinking. A prevalent,
research-based instructional strategy in education is for teachers to
use “think alouds” or cognitive modeling. 68 In this process, the
teacher is trained to become aware of the thinking used to complete
a specific task and then make the thinking explicit to students by
describing it as they perform the task. This may explain in part why
education master’s degree students’ metacognitive regulation scores
were significantly higher than the regulation scores of business
students or law students. Although some of the law or business
students in the study may have been trained as teachers, this would
most likely be a relatively small percentage.
In addition, all of the education students and most of the
business students had work experience in their field of current study.
The work experience of these two groups may be a factor in
distinguishing their performance from that of law students. In
addition to age, prior related work experience may facilitate
developing metacognitive skills. Some of the law students worked
following their undergraduate degree and before applying to law
school, but most did not. Future studies need to run comparison
groups based on prior work experience, age, undergraduate major,
and other more specific demographics.

66. See supra note 54 and infra notes 73–76.
67. See Penée W. Stewart, Susan S. Cooper & Louise R. Moulding, Metacognitive
Development in Professional Educators, 21 RESEARCHER 32 (2007).
68. See Cathy Collins Block & Susan E. Israel, The ABCs of Performing Highly Effective
Think-Alouds, 58 THE READING TCHR. 154, 154 (2004); Dale H. Schunk, Self-Efficacy for
Reading and Writing: Influence of Modeling, Goal Setting, and Self-Evaluation, 19 READING &
WRITING Q.: OVERCOMING LEARNING DIFFICULTIES 159, 162–69 (2003); Jeffrey D.
Wilhelm, Think-Alouds Boost Reading Comprehension, SCHOLASTIC INSTRUCTOR, Nov.–Dec.
2001, at 26.
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Another factor could be that many of the law students in this
study may be sufficiently intellectually talented that undergraduate
academic success came without truly honing their learning processes.
Like athletes who have relied on their natural abilities through high
school and college, they eventually come to the point where the
rubber hits the road and they must learn to manage their talent to
meet new competitive demands. Although the law students’
undergraduate grades were generally higher than the business and
education students, it is easily possible that the more important
factors were intelligence, time devoted to study, and motivation.
Undergraduate students with well-developed metacognitive skills
would perform better than their other abilities would predict;
students with higher levels of talent, time, and motivation would
score even better than they now do with well-developed
metacognitive skills.
Unfortunately, law school applicants who have received high
undergraduate grades based on their diligence and raw intelligence
may not have enough to rise to the top in law school, let alone in
practice. Law students face competition unlike in their prior
endeavors, and thinking like a lawyer requires something more.
Highly qualified students have the natural talent, but their
capabilities may not be realized without focused instructional
intervention. 69 A student with less talent but metacognitive skills
could out-perform a student with more talent but no metacognitive
skills; a student with natural talent and metacognition would be
more capable of performing at the highest level.
In a study of 179 undergraduate students, Savia Coutinho found
a weak correlation between metacognition and GPA, meaning it is
difficult to predict whether a student will have a high or low GPA
solely based on their level of metacognition. 70 Conversely, students
who have both high natural intelligence ability and well-honed
metacognitive skills performed much better than those students who
have only high intelligence ability or only developed metacognitive
skills. 71 Metacognition enhances the academic performance for
whatever ability level the student exhibits. Many of the law students
69. MARK QUIRK, INTUITION AND METACOGNITION IN MEDICAL EDUCATION: KEYS
132 (2006).
70. Coutinho, supra note 9, at 43. The MAI was used to measure the level of
metacognition in this study.
71. Id.
TO DEVELOPING EXPERTISE
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in this study may have enjoyed sufficient academic performance as
undergraduates without having to engage in metacognition
regulation. The thinking demands of law and the highly competitive
legal market will require focusing on a skill they have not honed in
their prior education.
Those who can readily adapt and figure out how to crank up the
volume move ahead. Nancy Millich observed:
Most law students have succeeded in their undergraduate
careers because they have mastered traditional learning
methods. They have developed the skills of memorization,
note-taking, and review that are recommended by many texts
dealing with how to succeed in law school. However, they
have failed to understand that law school requires an
additional layer of learning . . . [and] that “traditional study
skills materials generally do not teach students to monitor
and then change their learning and studying activities as the
situation demands.” 72
The demands of legal education, where professors often push
students out of their comfort zone, put more pressure on students’
natural learning styles to prepare students for the new thinking
hurdles that will bombard them in the profession.
Although no other research explores the metacognition of law
students, the work with medical students, although limited, sheds
some light on both of the possible explanations we discussed above.
To begin with, medical students are more similar to law students in
terms of innate ability and past academic achievement. Medical
students are also not likely to have much in terms of training to
understand their own or others’ thinking in the way that teachers do.
Sevgi Turan and his co-researchers used the same instrument
used in our study, the MAI, to examine the metacognition of 862
medical students from four different medical schools, each of which
used different curricular models. 73 The results showed that many

72. Nancy Millich, Building Blocks of Analysis: Using Simple “Sesame Street Skills” and
Sophisticated Educational Learning Theories in Teaching a Seminar in Legal Analysis and
Writing, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1127, 1145 (1994) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Paul T.
Wangerin, Learning Strategies for Law Students, 52 ALB. L. REV. 471, 477 (1988) (citing Ann
L. Brown & Annemarie Sullivan Palincsar, Inducing Strategic Learning from Texts by Means of
Informed, Self-Control Training, 2 TOPICS IN LEARNING & LEARNING DISABILITIES 1, 3–4
(1982))).
73. Turan et al., supra note 9, at 478.
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medical students had low levels of metacognitive skills
notwithstanding their academic achievement. 74 In addition, Turan’s
study showed links between higher metacognition regulation scores
and the kind of reflective experience-based learning teachers have.
The medical students from the one school using a problem-based
curriculum—where students participated in various clinical settings
and then discussed and reflected on what the experience taught
them—had significantly higher MAI scores than the students
attending the other schools. 75 This finding is very significant, and
studies of this sort need to be conducted with law students
comparing various teaching approaches, especially the use of handson clinics.
It may also be that the prior work experience of education and
business master’s degree students replicated this clinic-type
approach, and law students who had not worked between college
and law school were deprived of this advantage. Not all work
experience would do so. It would need to be reflective and closely
mentored.
III. THE NEED FOR METACOGNITIVE SKILLS IN LAW
Although more work needs to be done with larger samples,
including more information about the subjects’ backgrounds and
characteristics, our research demonstrates that law students,
notwithstanding their prior academic achievements, may not have
well-developed metacognitive regulation skills. The next questions to
address are, first, whether metacognitive skills are truly needed in the
law, and, second, whether such skills can be taught to those law
students who are not yet proficient regulators of their thinking
processes and strategies.
As with law students, no studies have been published showing
the level of metacognitive skills in practicing lawyers or comparing
those skills between successful and less successful practitioners. The
following section describes what education researchers have shown
about metacognitive skills and then relates these skills to those
needed in the practice of law. Just as with students, some lawyers
may be limping along on their I.Q. or hard work. What is clear from
this discussion, however, is that lawyers are particularly engaged in
74. Id. at 481.
75. Id.
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the kind of work that is enhanced by high metacognitive skills. The
educational psychology research discussed above supports the
proposition that any student, any thinker at any level, can maximize
his or her innate intellectual talent by developing metacognitive
skills. 76 In addition, an examination of the particular kinds of thinking
demands that recur in law suggests that even the most intellectually
qualified will profit from acute metacognitive regulation.
To begin with, lawyers must continually improve in rhetoric, the
manipulation of language, and the comprehension of long and dense
texts. In this endeavor, comprehension, writing, attention, and
memory are obviously invaluable. Metacognition enhances these
abilities. The experts in educational science link metacognition
especially with “oral communication of information, oral persuasion,
oral comprehension, reading comprehension, writing, . . . attention,
memory, [and] problem solving . . . .” 77
In addition to the ability to think, lawyers rely on other skills that
are enhanced by a well-developed metacognitive awareness and
regulation. 78 Perhaps the most important is the ability to learn
consistently how to think better when encountering each new legal
problem. In addition, a lawyer needs excellent ability in oral
communication and persuasion, reading and writing, fact gathering,
and stress management. All of these are enhanced by high
metacognition. Law is a profession centered on resolving complex
disputes through competent advocacy. We will discuss each of these
in the context of metacognition.
A. Lifelong Learning
Legal education requires some memorization, but the law is
ambiguous, changing, and mutated by facts. Law professors have
struggled in trying to explain that they are not “hiding the ball,” but
instead that there is no ball. Moreover, law schools have long
recognized that they cannot teach students in three years the
doctrine, let alone the theory, for all the areas of law in which they

76. See supra Part I.
77. Flavell, supra note 7, at 907.
78. Id. at 906 (“[M]etacognition plays an important role in oral communication of
information, oral persuasion, oral comprehension, reading comprehension, writing, language
acquisition, attention, memory, problem solving, social cognition, and, various types of selfcontrol and self-instruction.”).
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may be asked to practice. And the doctrine in a particular area may
change even before the student graduates by a legislative enactment
or a dramatic change in policy by the Supreme Court. Thus, law
schools must aim to teach students to “think like a lawyer,” so they
leave armed to continually learn new law, new applications of the
law, and creative new ways to make and use law. The thinking skills
required to be a lawyer are articulated in a list compiled by Nancy
Shultz:
[L]awyers must be able to (1) analyze and synthesize legal
principles; organize and present a coherent and persuasive
line of reasoning in speech and writing; interview prospective
clients, examine witnesses, and draft pleadings or
interrogatories; listen, exercise judgment, and engage in
moral reasoning; and develop knowledge of self and of the
premises of the legal and the social order; (2) think
independently, master complex bodies of data, organize the
data into legal categories, and present the resulting
intellectual product in a persuasive manner that is designed
to achieve a particular goal; (3) critically analyze the utility,
effectiveness, and social implications of legal doctrine and
procedure; integrate nonlegal approaches into the legal
problem-solving process; and synthesize and build original
legal theories, frameworks, and systems; (4) figure out the
different goals that a particular client might choose to
pursue, sort out the relationships among different possible
goals, devise possible strategies for realizing a particular goal,
try to separate compatible from incompatible goals, and
prioritize among different possible goals. 79
This list is daunting, but surprisingly true to what lawyers must
do throughout their careers. Not included in this list is conquering
every body of law raised by each client’s facts as applied in every
jurisdiction in which the client does business or incurs liability. Each
of these activities is a demanding intellectual endeavor. Law school
cannot begin to give a student a formula that can solve all of these
puzzles, let alone address the substantive law. Notwithstanding
renewed enthusiasm in making skills courses available to students,
law schools cannot hope even to teach students all the mental skills
they need to excel. Therefore, today’s first-year student must
79. Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57, 60
(1992) (citations omitted).
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become a student over and over again to dig in and climb steep
learning curves. Law is a thirty- or forty-year course of study.
Professor Shultz concluded, “[p]erhaps the single most useful
cognitive skill for a good lawyer is the ability to learn from
experience.” 80
Learning how to learn each time faster, better, and with less
stress is invaluable. Metacognition generates from every learning
experience the awareness of how thinking happens and then, more
importantly, the ability to strategize and control thinking in the
next challenge. Thus, learning how to think better in the future is
a metacognitive skill of infinite value to a lawyer. Teaching
students to be these kinds of lifelong learners should be one of
the “biggest components of legal education,” 81 an idea taught by
Anthony Niedwiecki in his work on teaching metacognition in
legal research courses, outlined as follows:
The discussion about how to teach law students often
omits one of the biggest components of legal education:
the best way to train students to be lifelong learners.
Because law schools cannot teach students every area of
the law or every skill they will use as lawyers, the focus
should be on teaching them how to transfer their learning
in law school to the novel situations they will face in the
legal profession. . . . Lawyers need to learn new material on
a daily basis, whether that material is a legal concept, a
procedural rule, or a completely new discipline that is the
underlying substance of a legal problem. Those who are able
to learn efficiently and thoroughly are able to handle the
constant learning required of lawyers, and learning theorists
describe these individuals as expert learners. 82
The abilities that mark a lifelong “expert learner” strongly rely on
metacognitive skills. 83
80. Id.
81. Anthony Niedwiecki, Teaching for Lifelong Learning: Improving the Metacognitive
Skills of Law Students Through More Effective Formative Assessment Techniques, 40 CAP. U. L.
REV. 149, 153 (2012) [hereinafter Niedwiecki, Teaching].
82. Id. at 153–54 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 155 (citing Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law Students to be SelfRegulated Learners, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 447, 480 (2003)). Niedwiecki relies on the
definition of “expert learner” offered by Peggy A. Ertmer & Timothy J. Newby, The Expert
Learner: Strategic, Self-Regulated, and Reflective, 24 INSTRUCTIONAL SCI. 1, 1 (1996). They
explain, among other things, “that an expert learner is a strategic, self-regulated, and reflective
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B. Oral Communication

Excellent oral comprehension and oral persuasion are perhaps
more important in lawyering than in any other field. Litigators
must explain the facts and legal arguments for a judge or a jury
and respond quickly to the arguments and witnesses of the
opposing parties. This requires the litigator to use metacognitive
skills to quickly comprehend what he or she hears, process it, and
find words to explain a response. Outside of a courtroom, a good
lawyer must effectively explain the law and its application to a lay
client while guiding the client toward finding solutions. In
addition, much of any lawyer’s business consists of negotiating
with opposing parties and their counsel.
C. Hermeneutics and Drafting
In addition to oral communication, a lawyer must work with
complex texts. Metacognition enhances the ability to quickly
comprehend, process, and apply language in texts. 84 Lawyers write
motions, court briefs, contracts, settlement agreements, demand
letters, and a myriad of other documents. These must be precisely
and persuasively worded. Even before entering legal practice,
lawyers must complete reading assignments in law school that are
extraordinarily long and demanding. While reading, a reader uses
metacognition to monitor the complexity of the text, isolate
difficult passages for rereading, and stop to make connections
between different points within a text. The law student who can
do this faster and better can overtake other students who may
have higher intelligence.
learner who uses different types of knowledge to bring about successful learning.” Niedwiecki,
Teaching, supra note 81, at 154 n.30 (citing Ertmer & Newby, supra). Expert learners are also
“self-directed and goal-oriented” and use knowledge in conjunction with effective cognitive
strategies to enhance their opportunities to learn a wide array of information. Ertmer &
Newby, supra.
84. See, e.g., Margaret G. McKeown & Isabel L. Beck, The Role of Metacognition in
Understanding and Supporting Reading Comprehension, in HANDBOOK, supra note 39, at 7;
Keith W. Thiede et al., Metacognitive Monitoring During and After Reading, in HANDBOOK,
supra note 39, at 85. Both of these articles report on a wide variety of studies involving
reading comprehension and metacognitive skills. See also Peter Dewitz, Legal Education: A
Problem of Learning from Text, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 225, 229 (1997) (“This
twofold nature of self-regulation, monitoring of comprehension and repair of comprehension
breakdown, is called metacognition. Metacognition, or thinking about thinking, is critical to a
reader’s success especially when reading challenging text.”).
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These tasks continue after school: practicing lawyers do not
simply read—they must detect and prioritize details. In practice,
when reading documents from opposing counsel, interpreting
statutes, and conducting research through prior judicial opinions
and other sources of law, a lawyer must be able to quickly identify
the kinds of small and subtle distinctions in facts and analysis that
frequently wreak enormous consequences in legal results.
D. Factual Analysis
Metacognition may allow a lawyer to more efficiently gather
accurate facts and better evaluate clients’ options. 85 With each new
problem, lawyers with high metacognitive skills improve their ability
to strategize—to quickly identify what they already know, fill gaps in
that knowledge, and predict how much time it will take to solve a
problem. 86 The use of metacognition in client interviews is described
by John DiPippa and Martha Peters:
In interviewing clients, lawyers must stay alert to their own
mental patterns and ways they might distort clients’
information through their own biases and expectations. By
accessing the metacognitive process one can monitor one’s
own tendencies to prematurely diagnose clients’ issues, to
come to conclusions about facts or legal options because they
start to fall into a familiar pattern, and to stay alert to the
ways one’s values may interpret a client’s story. 87
The ability to monitor and control thinking helps avoid distorted
conclusions and mistakes in understanding and judgment. Having a
more accurate view of the facts is a giant leap toward forming a
persuasive argument.

85. John M. A. DiPippa & Martha M. Peters, The Lawyering Process: An Example of
Metacognition at Its Best, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 311, 322 (2003).
86. Niedwiecki, Teaching, supra note 81, at 158.
87. DiPippa & Peters, supra note 85.
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E. Anxiety Management

Metacognition reduces stress and arms lawyers with greater
confidence in their ability to tackle each new problem that enters the
door. In Angela Legg and Lawrence Locker, Jr.’s study of math
performance, students with higher metacognitive skills demonstrated
fewer negative, anxiety-related mental processes. 88 Although further
research needs to be done to examine the relationship between these
variables, Legg and Locker postulate that students with higher
metacognitive skills may focus more of their mental energy on using
productive “metacognitive processes to learn and think, rather than
[focusing on] anxiety related thoughts.” 89 This one benefit of
metacognition training alone is sufficient to justify efforts to include
it in legal education.
Many students experience severe anxiety in law school. Practicing
lawyers suffer more “alcoholism, divorce, suicide, and poor physical
health” than the general public. 90 While the exact statistics vary,
some studies have found that attorneys are two to six times more
likely than the general population to be depressed. 91 The exact
causes of these phenomena are unknown and may include a number
of features of the profession and the kind of personality drawn to the
profession. 92 Nonetheless, in addition to whatever other causes, the
88. See Legg & Locker, supra note 36.
89. Id. at 480; see also Niedwiecki, Teaching, supra note 81, at 158–59 (“Those with
strong metacognitive skills are better at these steps in the learning process and better at
determining the appropriate legal action.”).
90. Rebecca LeAnne Bowman, When a Law Degree Is Not Enough: The Necessity of a
Second Professional Degree for Lawyers, 14 (July 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University
of Iowa), available at http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1831&context=etd
(citing Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy and Ethical Member of an Unhappy,
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 874–80 (1999)); see also JEAN
STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, HOW LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY: A PROFESSION FAILS ITS
CREATIVE MINDS 53–57 (2005); Connie J.A. Beck et al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related
Problems and Other Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. &
HEALTH 1, 45 (1995–1996).
91. Rebecca Stonawski, In Addition to the Law Degree, 21 EDUC. & L.J. 267, 274
(2012) (citing Mark Hansen, The Less Final Option, 95 A.B.A. J. 35, 35 (2009).
92. See Stonawski, id., at 273, 282; see also Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A
Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L.
REV. 1337, 1416–21 (1997). According to information provided to CNN by the Centers for
Disease Control, “[l]awyers ranked fourth when the proportion of suicides in that profession is
compared to suicides in all other occupations in the study population.” Rosa Flores & Rose
Marie Arce, Why Are Lawyers Killing Themselves? CNN U.S. (Jan. 20, 2014, 2:42 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/19/us/lawyer-suicides/.
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role of stress and anxiety cannot be overestimated. As one expert
explained, if stress is chronic, “repeated challenges may demand
repeated bursts of vigilance. At some point, this vigilance may
become overgeneralized, leading an individual to conclude that he
must always be on guard—even in the absence of the stress. And
thus the realm of anxiety is entered.” 93 One attorney described the
“realm of anxiety” as feeling like “a coffee pot” that was continually
“brewing in his stomach” and that each file on the desk was a
“ticking time bomb about to go off.” 94 This attorney admitted that
as the anxiety grew, he became dysfunctional. 95 Lawyers who know
how to organize and regulate their thinking can move forward with
confidence when facing not only complex legal problems, but also
the debilitating dysfunction of depression.
In short, the practice of law is particularly likely to include tasks
that are enhanced by metacognitive skills. The best lawyers continue
to be challenged by the work. They should be able to improve with
each new case or transaction as they thoughtfully consider how they
solved prior problems and how they can solve others in the future
better and more efficiently. Lawyers’ trade and stock is words.
Metacognitive skills improve oral communication, written
communication, the deciphering of complex texts, and the ability to
see the nuanced factual connections that help a lawyer build a case
from a set of facts. Metacognitive thinkers develop patterns for
approaching and unraveling thinking problems, which gives them
confidence in new situations and helps relieve stress. These skills are
particularly pertinent to the practice of law.
IV. METACOGNITION IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND ATTEMPTS TO
TEACH IT
Given its importance, metacognition has garnered surprisingly
limited specific attention in legal scholarship to date, and what does
exist sometimes tends to confuse or blur the concept of
metacognition. Although both the MacCrate and Carnegie Reports
93. Robert Sapolsky, Taming Stress: An Emerging Understanding of the Brain’s Stress
Pathways Points Toward Treatments for Anxiety and Depression Beyond Valium and Prozac, 289
SCI. AM. 86, 88 (2003).
94. Daniel T. Lukasik, How Stress and Anxiety Become Depression, LAWYERS WITH
DEPRESSION (May 22, 2011), http://www.lawyerswithdepression.com/articles/how-stressand-anxiety-become-depression-2/.
95. Id.
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raise issues embodied by metacognition, 96 the only direct reference is
in the Carnegie Report and is in passing:
[P]rofessional schools cannot directly teach students to be
competent in any and all situations; rather, the essential goal
of professional schools must be to form practitioners who are
aware of what it takes to become competent in their chosen
domain and to equip them with the reflective capacity and
motivation to pursue genuine expertise. They must become
‘metacognitive’ about their own learning, to use the
psychologists’ term. 97
Moreover, metacognition training is directly included in the
practices of only a few law schools. 98 Those who have addressed
metacognition in the context of legal education and lawyering,
despite the differences in approach and proposed solutions, support
the broad idea that metacognitive skills are critical for law students, 99
as well as for lawyers. 100 In this section, we briefly review the extent
of extant legal scholarship on metacognition and clarify some
confusion and misuse of the term.

96. Schwartz, supra note 83, at 468 (“Although the MacCrate Report, perhaps the most
influential work addressing law school teaching ever written, nowhere uses the terms ‘selfregulated learning’ or ‘expert learning,’ it appears to have these concepts in mind in its
reference to one of the skills new lawyers should possess, ‘organization and management of
legal work.’”) (citing MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 140); see also Niedwiecki, Teaching,
supra note 81, at 165–66 (discussing the Carnegie Report and other critiques of legal
education in the context of the need for teaching metacognition).
97. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 173.
98. Boyle, supra note 27, at 13 (“Metacognition has received a modicum of attention in
law teaching. Paul T. Wangerin advocated metacognition well over a decade ago, and a
sprinkling of law professors have taken up the call.”).
99. See, e.g., Tonya Kowalski, True North: Navigating for the Transfer of Learning in
Legal Education, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 51, 55 (2010) [hereinafter Kowalski, True North]
(arguing that “metacognitive strategies . . . could help students bridge analytical skills from
first-year legal writing to writing for clinic; doctrinal knowledge from classroom discussion in
Constitutional Law to the final examination; and doctrinal knowledge from first-year Torts and
Contracts to a tortious interference suit encountered five years later in practice”).
100. See, e.g., Beryl Blaustone & Carmen Huertas-Noble, Lawyering at the Intersection of
Mediation and Community Economic Development: Interweaving Inclusive Legal Problem
Solving Skills in the Training of Effective Lawyers, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 157, 160 (2010)
(“At the intersection of empowerment-driven mediation practice and [community economic
development] lawyering is the central use of metacognitive self-awareness, robust information
gathering, active listening, language reframing, facilitation, problem-solving, and consensusbuilding skills.”); Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to
Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 153 (2010) (“Several avenues to
help lawyers better calibrate their metacognitive judgments are advised.”).
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In 1988, Paul T. Wangerin was the first to advocate teaching
metacognitive skills to law students. 101 Building on Wangerin’s
suggestions, Nancy Millich provided concrete examples of fostering
metacognition during legal writing courses. 102 For the next decade, a
handful of other scholars addressed Wangerin’s suggestion and the
term “metacognition” was occasionally referenced in articles focused
on other topics. 103
Although not focusing exclusively on metacognition, several
articles in this era included some relevant discussion of self-regulated
learning that typically included some sub-skills that are considered
components of metacognition. 104 While metacognition, selfregulation, and self-regulated learning are technically different skills,
many education scholars recognize that the meaning of these three
terms “have been inextricably intertwined within the educational
literature, either intentionally or unintentionally.” 105 This problem is
amplified in legal scholarship.
The role of metacognition in developing the skills of lawyering
has shown up more regularly since 2001, when Michael Schwartz
included metacognition as a part of his call for learning theory and
instructional design to be part of reform in legal education. 106 The
subsequent work, unfortunately, was plagued with confusion as legal

101. Wangerin, supra note 72, at 476–77 (1988) (“It is not enough for the student to be
aware of his or her abilities and learning processes; the student must be able to monitor those
studying activities during the learning process and be able to make appropriate adjustments.”).
102. Nancy Millich, supra, note 72, at 1145–48.
103. This scholarship is briefly described in Schwartz, supra note 83, at 468–71.
104. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 360 (1995) (“Just as there is a sound theoretical
and empirical basis for requiring law students to engage in the active process of extracting the
common patterns in appellate cases, there is an equally sound basis for requiring clinical
students to keep and maintain journals reflecting on the initial experiences of practice.”); M.H.
Sam Jacobson, A Primer on Learning Styles: Reaching Every Student, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
139, 142 (2001) (“When students learn how they learn best, they engage in metacognition.
Metacognition involves knowing how one learns and what results one achieves from different
learning processes; it involves self-regulation of cognitive activities through monitoring and
making appropriate adjustments.”); Paula Lustbader, From Dreams to Reality: The Emerging
Role of Law School Academic Support Programs, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 839, 852–83 (1997)
(discussing learning process for performing tasks rather than observing and improving raw
thinking).
105. Patricia A. Alexander, Why This and Why Now? Introduction to the Special Issue on
Metacognition, Self-Regulation, and Self-Regulation Learning, 20 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV.
369, 369 (2008).
106. Schwartz, supra, note 83, at 349–51, 435 n.430.
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scholars mistook metacognition as meaning reflection on the subjects
learned rather than on the process of thinking as its own concern. 107
Metacognition received more targeted attention following 2010,
although always in the realm of legal research courses. Paul Callister
argued for the use of a long-held taxonomy of thinking skills,
commonly referred to as “Bloom’s Taxonomy,” as revised by David
Krathwohl, to guide the structure of legal research courses. 108
Krathwohl’s revision added metacognition as a new category in the
taxonomy, defining it as “[k]nowledge about cognition in general as
well as awareness of and knowledge about one’s own cognition.” 109
Metacognition, Callister contends, is essential to learning from
mistakes and correcting them as a law student makes his or her way
through the rigors of legal research. 110 Callister identifies a specific
competency within legal research that places metacognition as an
essential skill for active construction of knowledge based on
experience. 111 This connection of metacognition to schema
construction is unique, even for educational research and is one that
should be further pursued.
Callister suggests several types of tasks to build metacognition. 112
First, he recommends reiterative assignments that require selfassessment of what is working and not working. 113 Second, he
suggests group presentations that are critiqued by peers. 114 Note that
this activity spurs metacognition only if peers ask questions that
require self-assessment of the tasks involved. Third, he recommends
reflection logs and diaries, which promote metacognition only if the
students document the cognitive processes of their research and
107. See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach, Note, Musings on Idea(l)s in the Ethical Regulation
of Mediators: Honesty, Enforcement, and Education, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 123, 158–
59 (2005) (“Time should also be allotted for the reflective portion of learning, which calls on
metacognition to think and reflect upon the matters learned. Approaches that can be used in
this regard include tools such as student journals or diaries, ‘coffee talk’ or small group
discussions.”).
108. Paul D. Callister, Time to Blossom: An Inquiry into Bloom’s Taxonomy as a Hierarchy
and Means for Teaching Legal Research Skills, LAW LIBR. J., Spring 2010, at 191.
109. David R. Krathwohl, A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy: An Overview, 41 THEORY
INTO PRAC. 212, 214 (2002). See also S. Rajkumar, The Role of Metacognition in Learning and
Teaching of Physics, SCH. SCI., Mar.–June 2010, at 48, 48.
110. Callister supra note 108, at 210–11.
111. Id.
112. Callister, supra note 108, at 217–18.
113. Id. at 217.
114. Id.

1083

02.PRESTON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/20/2015 5:46 PM

2014

evaluate them for patterns of thinking behavior that were more or
less successful. 115 He concludes with asking a student to create a
schema for understanding the research. 116 These suggestions are
similar to what education theorists have long considered
metacognitive tasks. Unfortunately, Callister’s examples do not
explicitly identify the critical attributes of the tasks that make them
metacognitive and therefore he does not provide enough guidance
for using them as metacognitive exercises.
Adding to Callister’s work, Kristina Niedringhaus called for
metacognition to be part of explicit instruction within legal research
courses. 117 In addition, she provided several examples of specific
exercises to build metacognition: modeling, predicting outcomes,
reflection, graphic organizers, and directed student teaching. 118
Unfortunately, while they all include active engagement of students
in the learning process, some of these suggestions, such as graphic
organizers and simple reflection, are not necessarily metacognitive
and would not, by themselves, accomplish the goal of developing
metacognition. Recording reflections in journals and blogs is
metacognitive only if students use these resources to identify and
reflect on their learning processes, and consequently re-direct such
processes. Using journals and blogs simply to reflect on substantive
content will not build metacognition. 119
After noting that guided and structured metacognitive reflection
does not appear to be in wide use yet in law school training, Tonya
Kowalski tied metacognition to the critical skill of “transferring”
knowledge. 120 Specifically, she described the apparent loss of skill in
115. Id. at 218.
116. Id.
117. Kristina L. Niedringhaus, Teaching Better Research Skills by Teaching Metacognitive
Ability, 18 PERSP: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 113, 115–17 (2010) (discussing many
ideas for implementing the teaching of metacognitive skills into a legal research and writing
class, including self-questioning, predicting outcomes, forcing “thinking about thinking”
through unfamiliar subject areas, and modeling).
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
120. Tonya Kowalski, Toward a Pedagogy for Teaching Legal Writing in Law School
Clinics, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 285, 288–91, 332 (2010) [hereinafter Kowalski, Toward];
Kowalski, True North, supra note 99, at 51–53, 64–65; see also Daniela Lucangeli, Doriana
Galderisi & Cesare Cornoldi, Specific and General Transfer Effects Following Metamemory
Training, 10 LEARNING DISABILITIES RES. & PRAC. 11 (1995) (reporting on a series of
studies showing that metacognitive training increased the transfer or generalizability of
knowledge from one context to another).

1084

02.PRESTON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1053

8/20/2015 5:46 PM

Teaching “Thinking Like a Lawyer”

writing from first-year writing courses to clinical practice in the
second and third years. She suggested steps to aid students in using
acquired skills in later contexts, including asking students to
“consciously connect their learning to experience in a process often
referred to as metacognitive reflection.” 121 In addition, she identified
three exercises to foster metacognition: transfer exercises, private
memos, and journals. 122 These reflective exercises engage
metacognition when the students go beyond recording what
happened or the content of what they learned and describe the
strengths and weaknesses of their thinking process, take actions to
correct errors or weaknesses, and propose solutions for improving
their thinking processes. Elsewhere Kowalski clarifies that “deliberate
effort” by students is critical to make reflection activities foster
metacognition. 123 If students underestimate the importance of
metacognitive exercises, they “may tend to see these deceptively
simple devices as mere ‘fluff.’” 124
Several of the teaching activities described are beneficial and
good models for other law teachers. However, it is important to note
that, in our descriptions of the activities suggested by Callister,
Niedringhaus, and Kowalski, there is an “if” clause that must be
included for the activities to be truly metacognitive and not just
engaging instructional strategies.
Anthony Niedwiecki has provided the best legal scholarship on
metacognition to date. 125 His 2012 article provides a useful
explanation of metacognition’s role in legal learning and includes
an excellent working definition of metacognition:
Metacognition also can be described as the internal voice
people hear when they are engaged in the learning
process—the voice that will tell them what they have to do
to accomplish a task, what they already know, what they do
not know, how to match their previous learning to the new
situation, when they do not understand what they are
reading or learning, and how to evaluate their learning. It is

121. Kowalski, Toward, supra note 120, at 324.
122. Id. at 332–35.
123. Kowalski, True North, supra note 99, at 73–74.
124. Id. at 108.
125. See, e.g., Niedwiecki, Teaching, supra note 81, at 155; Niedwiecki, Lawyers, supra
note 10, at 45.
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this internal reflection and conscious control of the learning
process that goes to the heart of metacognition. 126
The principal focus of Niedwiecki’s work is aimed at teaching
techniques for improving students’ metacognitive skills as part of
the legal writing curriculum. 127 Niedwiecki recommends student
self-assessments as tools to develop metacognitive skills. The first
self-assessment tool is implemented at the beginning of the course
when the students articulate the thinking processes they bring to
the class, “including their past learning experiences, their own skill
set, their cognitive abilities and preferences, and which skills the
course requires.” 128 His second method is to require the students
to use a self-assessment tool immediately after submitting an
assignment, in which the students identify the strengths and
weaknesses of their work. 129 Once the professor’s critique of the
assignment is returned, the students compare their self-assessment
with the professor’s. Should the two assessments differ, the student
must determine why they differ and evaluate the problems with
their self-assessment. 130 As students go through this self-assessment
routine, they not only learn legal writing in the course, they also
learn the skills needed to be aware of the strengths and weaknesses
of their thinking in all their courses.
Although Niedwiecki and others recognize the need for
training students as self-regulated learners and are beginning to
employ proper teaching methods, as of yet, few law schools teach
131
Even when scholars argue for more
metacognitive skills.
metacognition training in law school education, they likely assume
that law students, as previously successful students, already have
fairly well-developed metacognitive skills and merely need more
opportunities to “become more conscious metacognitive
132
learners.”
Some, including civil procedure professors Andrea

126. Niedwiecki, Teaching, supra note 81, at 156–57 (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 193.
128. Id. at 186.
129. Id. at 188.
130. Id. at 188–89.
131. Id. at 166.
132. Miriam E. Felsenburg & Laura P. Graham, Beginning Legal Writers in Their Own
Words: Why the First Weeks of Legal Writing Are So Tough and What We Can Do About It, 16
LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 223, 294–95 (2010).
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assert this
Curcio, Gregory Jones, and Tanya Washington,
directly, making the incorrect leap that prior academic success
means high metacognitive skills. For instance, “Because law
students have been successful students in other areas, we can
134
assume that they are likely already metacognitive learners.”
Niedwiecki’s experience, however, suggests the opposite:
[S]tudents often come to law school with several
metacognitive deficiencies. For example: 1) they don’t know
when a task is easy or difficult; 2) they do not fully
understand when they are confused or do not fully
understand a particular concept; 3) they do not always know
how long some task may take and what they need to do; 4)
they do not monitor the success of what they are doing by
determining when they have studied enough; 5) they do not
always use all of the relevant information; 6) they often use
step-by-step approaches without thinking about why they
used the particular approach; and 7) they often jump to
preliminary conclusions that guide their complete analysis,
135
even when they ultimately turn out to be incorrect.
The results of our study substantiate his intuition on law student
skills. We cannot assume that law students, no matter how successful
in prior endeavors, have achieved, either inherently or through other
training, the kind of metacognitive skills so essential to top
performance in the profession they have chosen.
V. WHAT IS NEXT: RESEARCH AND SOCRATIC METHOD
Three important steps must be undertaken in the process of recreating legal education to account for the vast body of knowledge
recently accumulated on metacognition. In this Part, we address the
need for additional empirical work involving law students and
practicing lawyers and the need for more scholarship on how to
teach metacognitive skills, especially with respect to the use of
Socratic Method.

133. Andrea A. Curcio, Gregory Todd Jones, & Tanya M. Washington, Does Practice
Make Perfect? An Empirical Examination of the Impact of Practice Essays on Essay Exam
Performance, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 280–81 (2008).
134. Felsenburg & Graham, supra note 132, at 295.
135. Niedwiecki, Lawyers, supra note 10, at 45.
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Educational psychologists have called for researchers to “engage
in more detailed study of how changes in metacognition, selfregulation, and self-regulated learning affect educational outcomes”
across the board. 136 Further research may also reveal why students in
various graduate disciplines perform differently in metacognition
measurements. Because of the link between metacognition skills and
the tasks required of law students and lawyers, further study of law
students is warranted. Additional research needs to be done with
more law student participants and across a wide variety of law
schools, preferably over a multi-year period. Future research should
determine whether there is a relationship between metacognitive
abilities and the GPA earned during law school. It may be that low
metacognitive abilities will correlate with a lower law school GPA
and high metacognitive abilities will correlate with a higher law
school GPA, even if high metacognitive skills are not evidenced by
high undergraduate GPAs and test scores. If there is anything to the
mantra of “thinking like a lawyer,” then metacognitive skills could be
essential for the higher cognitive demands of law. It is also possible
that legal education, even without any effort to address
metacognition directly, results in some improvement in at least some
metacognitive skills.
In addition to seeking more data on law students, scholars need
to widen the scope to study law graduates and practicing attorneys.
A useful endeavor is research measuring the metacognitive abilities of
successful attorneys and the uses of metacognitive skills in various
kinds of practice.
Research is also needed investigating the impact of deliberate
instruction of metacognition in law school. The limited scholarly
writing in law so far has discussed the development of metacognitive
skills primarily in legal research and writing courses. Also useful
would be a study of whether metacognitive skills are or can be
effectively taught in substantive law courses.
Of course, this work should explore the merits of Socratic
Method. According to Professor Niedwiecki, traditional legal
education, even at its finest, is insufficient to teach metacognitive
skills. Although he acknowledges a link between metacognition and
Socratic Method, he argues that Socratic Method “teaches

136. Dale H. Schunk, Metacognition, Self-Regulation, and Self-Regulated Learning:
Research Recommendations, 20 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 463, 466 (2008).
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metacognition implicitly and is only likely to help students who
already have strong metacognitive strategies. For example, many
professors simply do not explain the basis for the particular questions
or the types of reasoning that they are asking the students [to]
develop.” 137 Other commentators on legal education are virulent in
the dislike of Socratic Method but seem confused about what is the
fault of the method and what is the fault of the particular professor
and the natural pressures of a highly competitive and highly
demanding environment. 138 On the other hand, many education
theorists have suggested positive associations between Socratic
Method and teaching metacognition. 139 This relationship warrants
further exploration and suggests that reformation of legal education

137. Niedwiecki, Teaching, supra note 81, at 163 (citations omitted); Niedwiecki,
Lawyers, supra note 10, at 34–35, 44–46.
138. See Cheryl B. Preston & Hilary Lawrence, UnProfessionalism and Bar Association
Bashing, (forthcoming MICH. J. L. REFORM, 2015) (manuscript at 143–44) (on file with
authors); see also, e.g., Andrea M. Alonso & Kevin G. Faley, The Law Firm Culture of Abuse,
VT. B.J. & L. DIG., June 1999, at 38, 39 (1999) (asking whether the increased lack of civility
has its “beginnings in the brutal Socratic method used by some law school professors”); David
L. Baker, Should Law-School Applications Include a Warning Label?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1495,
1506 (2011) (“If the professor is not civil in grilling a student under the Socratic method or
providing feedback on a research paper, the aspiring lawyer learns incivility is appropriate
behavior. Similarly, a professor who is unduly flippant or critical during class of a court’s
decision reinforces an attitude of incivility.”); Catherine Therese Clarke, Missed Manners in
Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L. REV. 945, 1023 (1991) (“[A]n awareness of expected
standards of professionalism should exist at every level of law school training. Undoubtedly,
the traditional socratic method [sic] would be ineffective in teaching the practical, professional
skills of courtroom decorum.”); Paul T. Hayden, Applying Client-Lawyer Models in Legal
Education, 21 LEGAL STUD. F. 301, 303 (1997) (suggesting that Socratic Method teaches that
a “super-competent lawyer is brusque, dominating, and often condescending to those less
competent (a category that certainly includes clients).”); Jennifer Howard, Clinical Essay,
Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” Through Experience, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 167, 173–74
(1995) (arguing that “the psychological impact of [the Socratic Method] simultaneously
injures students and distorts their preparation for the interpersonal requirements of practice”);
Kerr, supra note 2, at 115 (characterizing Socratic Method as “a weapon used to oppress
students and eradicate independent thinking”); Michael Millemann, Symposium: 1997 W.M.
Keck Foundation Forum on the Teaching of Legal Ethic, The Institutional Barriers and
Advantages Panel, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 489, 496 (1998) (quoting panel member, Bruce
Green) (“[T]he ‘Socratic method often is inconsistent’ with civility . . . .”); Michael Vitiello,
Professor Kingsfield: The Most Misunderstood Character in Literature, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
955, 956 (2004) (discussing claims that “the Socratic method in the hands of professors like
Kingsfield . . . causes incivility between attorneys”); Gerald F. Uelmen, Symposium on Humor
and the Law, 1992 BYU L. REV. 335, 343 (1992) (“The traditional Socratic technique, which
is undoubtedly the least civil form of dialogue ever devised, will have to be discarded. The
teacher will have to serve as a role model of gracious civility.”).
139. See supra note 4.
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will not be successful if all that is added are skills courses and practice
clinics.
Legal educators grasping for the cornerstones of a law school
experience for the twenty-first century should take notice of the
work in medical schools. Mark Quirk, in his book Intuition and
Metacognition in Medical Education, calls for a new paradigm of
medical education to incorporate teaching metacognition:
Ultimately,
learning
from
experience
requires
metacognition—the ability to think about one’s thinking and
feeling and to predict what others are thinking.
Metacognition is a critical feature of the emerging paradigm
for clinical learning that shifts the emphasis in medical
education from application of knowledge learned in the
classroom to preparing students to effectively practice
medicine and learn from their experiences. It focuses on the
learner’s ability to regulate experience with insight about self
and the ability to monitor and control knowledge rather than
be overwhelmed by it. 140
The same analysis applies to law schools. Although legal
education has become more accepting of clinical and experiential
learning, such pedagogy needs to be constructed with acute
awareness of the need to inculcate metacognitive skills—the ability to
continue learning faster and better from each future experience—and
the role of substantive law courses. And, as in law, if the skill needed
for practice is the ability to think, experiences in thinking (and review
of how to think better next time) are essential. That may be the best
and highest use of Socratic Method. Before we throw Socratic
Method out with the bathwater, the relationship between it and
learning metacognition must be more fully explored.
In the preface to Quirk’s book on medical schools, the father of
metacognition science, Flavell, acknowledges that medical students
“are not your everyday, run-of-the-mill learners.” 141 They have the
140. QUIRK, supra note 69, at 4. “The persistent popular view is that the expert
‘becomes so from an overwhelming mastery of content-specific knowledge.’ On the contrary,
it is proposed here that the expert becomes so from an overwhelming mastery of the skills
required to continuously master content-specific knowledge. This marks a fundamental shift in
our approach to medical education. . . . Although content mastery is still a critical outcome,
metacognition and intuition—the processes of learning from and acting on experience—are
the capabilities of medical expertise.” Id. at 11–12 (quoting Mark Graber, Metacognitive
Training to Reduce Diagnostic Errors: Ready for Prime Time?, 78 ACAD. MED. 781 (2003)).
141. John Flavell, Preface to id., at xv, xvi.
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intelligence, discipline, and drive necessary to do what it takes to be
successful. “If [medical students are] really convinced that becoming
more metacognitively sensitive and skilled would make them better
physicians, it is hard to believe that these ‘superlearners’ could not
and would not do so.” 142 The same is true of law students.
Underlying Quirk’s call to action is the clear assumption that medical
students’ metacognition is underdeveloped, but, more importantly, it
is reaffirming that metacognition is not natural in high-achieving
undergraduate students and can be taught and learned.
We challenge legal educators to recognize the apparent
deficiency in student metacognitive skills illustrated by our study and
incorporate curricula and other pedagogical techniques to help
students develop this crucial skill. As students develop metacognitive
skills, they not only gain the ability to become successful attorneys,
but also to contribute to the success of the overall legal system and,
with that, to the success of government and society.

142. Id.
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Appendix A
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Age and Gender by Group
Gender

Age

Male

Female

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Business

62

11

31.03

6.41

Education

15

38

34.28

8.23

Law

90

60

25.72

3.64

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for MAI Scores (Knowledge, Regulation and
Total) by Group
Knowledge

Regulation

Total

Program

n

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Business

73

65.92

7.79

125.08

16.44

191.00

22.79

Education

53

68.32

7.10

134.11

17.61

202.43

22.38

Law

150

68.06

7.28

116.01

15.98

184.07

21.75
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Table 3
One-Way Analysis of Co-variance for MAI Scores (Knowledge,
Regulation, and Total)
df

Sum of
Squares

Mean Square

F

Age

1

8.14

8.14

0.15

Between Groups

2

252.08

126.04

2.28

269

14871.58

55.29

Age

1

1088.01

1088.01

4.08*

Between Groups

2

6733.67

3366.83

12.63**

269

71700.79

266.55

Age

1

907.92

907.92

1.85

Between Groups

2

7005.45

3502.73

7.13**

269

132245.36

491.62

Knowledge

Within Groups
Regulation

Within Groups
Total Score

Within Groups
* p<0.05, **p<0.01
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Table 4
Tambane Post Hoc Analysis of Regulation and Total Score Mean
Differences by Program
Regulation
Mean
Group (I)

Group (J)

Difference

Standard
Error

(I-J)
Business

Education
Law

Education

Business
Law

Law

Education

Business
* p<0.05, **p<0.01

1094

Total
Mean
Difference

Standard
Error

(I-J)

-9.031*

3.091

-11.434*

4.071

11.794**

2.983

10.416*

4.279

9.031*

3.091

11.434*

4.071

20.827**

3.323

20.827**

3.323

21.850**

4.544

-11.796*

2.983

-10.416*

4.279

21.850**

4.544

